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cessation of military operations, for example:
on the question “Establishment of a military
demarcation line between the two sides for
the purpose of establishment of a demilita-
rized zone” an agreement has already been
reached on three points.
On the question “working out practical
measures for the implementation of a
ceasefire and armistice in Korea, including
the personnel, powers and functions of the
apparatus for monitoring the implementa-
tion of the conditions of the ceasefire and
armistice” an agreement has already been
reached on six points (the texts are attached).
However, on the questions “Measures
about prisoners of war” the enemy in prin-
ciple cannot oppose the liberation of all pris-
oners of war. As a consequence of this, the
negotiations cannot be dragged out for a long
time. Nevertheless, the enemy is trying to
drag out the negotiations under the pretext of
a rash demand about limiting the rebuilding
and construction of airports after the cessa-
tion of military operations and also a demand
about liberation of prisoners on a voluntary
basis. However, in view of the fact that our
side decisively opposes these proposals and
also in view of the fact that it is very difficult
for the enemy to mobilize public opinion for
continuation of the war in Korea, the satel-
lites of the enemy and the USA itself are
trying to bring an end to the war in Korea,
therefore in recent days the enemy was forced
to set aside the discussion of the question of
limiting restoration and construction of air-
ports in Korea and moved to discussion of
small questions concerning the agreement.
According to the concrete conditions of
the text of the agreement on an armistice
proposed by the enemy, it is obvious that, as
before, this text is not final, in other words
that, as before, the enemy has included con-
ditions about limiting the restoration and
construction of airports and about liberation
of prisoners of war on a voluntary basis, after
having declared that these conditions can be
omitted and it is possible not to discuss them.
From this it is obvious that the possibility of
reaching a final agreement is increasing. Of
course, we never have and are not now count-
ing only on these possibilities.
We simultaneously will vigilantly fol-
low the tricks of the ruling circles of the USA
who in view of the growth of internal and
external opposition will carry out as before a
policy of prolonging and even of breaking
down the negotiations in order to strain the
international situation even more. However
we are prepared in military and in political
relations to inflict decisive blows on the
enemy in order to shatter its plans. At the
present time both sides in the negotiations
have already moved over to detailed discus-
sion of the questions.
For the purposes of achieving a final
agreement on an armistice it is necessary to
receive your concrete instructions on the
following questions:
1. About the monitoring organ com-
posed of representatives of neutral states.
The American side proposes that both
sides each invite three states whose armed
forces are not participating in the military
operations in Korea, and also that each in-
vited state name one senior officer as a rep-
resentative (in all 6 persons from the neutral
states of both sides) for the creation of a
monitoring organ of neutral states.
We intend to agree with this arrange-
ment and ask the Soviet Union, Poland and
Czechoslovakia to send representatives so
that they could discuss the matter on an equal
basis with representatives of the three states
invited by the USA and also have the right to
veto.
2. Each of the abovementioned neutral
states must name one deputy representative
who could participate in the meetings of the
No. 72/III
[Source: APRF, Fond 45, Opis 1, Delo 342,
List 78 and AVPRF, Fond 059a, Opis 5a,
Delo 5, Papka 11, List 80]
102. 8 February 1952, ciphered telegram,
Mao Zedong to Filippov (Stalin) convey-
ing 22 January 1952 telegram from Peng
Dehuai to Mao and 4 February 1962 reply
from Mao to Peng Dehuai
SECOND MAIN ADMINISTRATION OF
THE GENERAL STAFF OF THE SOVIET
ARMY
CIPHERED TELEGRAM No. 16293
Copies: Stalin (2), Molotov, Malenkov, Beria,
Bulganin
From BEIJING
Received 21:45
8.2.1952
SERIES “G” T
TO FILIPPOV [Stalin]
I send you for familiarization the abbre-
viated text of the telegram to me from Peng
Dehuai of 22.1 of this year and my answer of
4.2 of this year.
The telegram of Comrade Peng Dehuai
of 22.1 of this year.
“1. 16.1 of this year the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of [North] Korea Pak Hon-
Yong was at my place. In a conversation he
said that the Korean people throughout the
country demand peace and do not want to
continue the war.
If the Soviet Union and China consider
it advantageous to continue the war, then the
Central Committee of the Labor Party will be
able to overcome any difficulties and hold to
their position.
I answered that a peaceful settlement on
the basis of justice and rationality is advanta-
geous for us. I also explained to him about
the favorable conditions of our side in the
present military situation and about the in-
crease in the difficulties of America. There-
fore an agreement on an armistice can be
reached. However in military relations we
will carry out active preparation of our forces
for further conduct of military operations.
While departing, Minister Pak Hon Yong
agreed with my point of view about the
general situation and said that his visit had
the goal of a simple meeting and his opinion
is not the opinion of the Central Committee
of the Labor party and the Korean govern-
ment, but purely his personal opinion.
2. In 1951 the Korean government col-
all 15 points.
At each point a region of operation for
the neutral state must be established within
a radius of 30 miles from the center of the
point.
We consider that the enemy has pro-
posed too many points, the area of operation
is too broad, and the number of open points
is not equal. We intend to agree that both
sides open 3-5 points each in North Korea:
Singisiu, Seisin, Khanko, Manpkhodin and
one airport.
In South Korea: Pusan,
Chemulpo, Suigei, Reisui, Khokodo. We
also intend to propose that the radius of
operations of the neutral group be estab-
lished as 5 kilometers from the center of the
point.
6. Neutral groups of observers will be
attached to the monitoring organ of neutral
states. The group must be organized as a [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]