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vative conceptions of the Kremlin rulers, it could approve with this plan, since, in his opinion, the Hungarian events
of liberalization in Hungary only to the degree that it did had gone in the direction of  counter-revolution. 15 True,
not threaten the existence of communist power there. Steps later, when the suppression of the Hungarian revolution by
taken by Belgrade at the very beginning of November the Soviet troops elicited widespread disappointment and
were a reflection of this ambiguous position. condemnation from throughout the world, the Yugoslav
Judging by its actions, the Soviet leadership consid- leadership, in a secret memorandum to Moscow, main-
ered the Yugoslav position to some extent ambiguous. tained that at the Brioni meeting it had accepted the Soviet
Having decided on October 31 to militarily intercede again plan with reservations, as a  lesser evil, since Khrushchev
and to replace Nagy s government with a new government and Malenkov had declared that no other means existed for
subservient to Moscow, the CC CPSU Presidium believed preventing the restoration of capitalism in Hungary.
it necessary to hold talks regarding the impending military However, from the very same memorandum, it followed
strike with Tito, the leaders of Bulgaria, Romania, and that Yugoslav reservations did not at all call into question
Czechoslovakia (the agreement of which was never in the undertaking of military actions, but instead stressed the
doubt) and with the new leadership in Poland.9 The goal importance of taking care to insure that the costs of
pursued by the Kremlin was obvious: afraid that Tito and  preserving socialism to be incurred by the punitive
Wladyslaw Gomulka might condemn the impending measures employed by the Soviet forces should be held to
military action, Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev tried to a minimum. In essence, Tito stated in his correspondence
incline them through direct negotiation toward some sort that the Soviet leadership should  normalize the situation
of agreement with it, using the argument that a counter- in Hungary not solely by military force but by accompany-
revolution had taken the upper hand in Hungary, threaten- ing simultaneous political measures to create a suitable
ing the complete liquidation of socialist development and Hungarian government with Kadar at its head, which
the establishment of Western control there. As is made would consist of people who had not been compromised
clear in Khrushchev s memoirs, this very argument was set under Rakosi and were capable of uniting the forces
out at the secret meeting of Khrushchev and CC CPSU supporting the  continuing progress of socialism. 16 This
Presidium members Viacheslav Molotov and Georgii accorded with the intentions of Moscow, which had
Malenkov with Gomulka and the premier of the Polish already been planning such a step and of which
government, Juzef Tsirankevich in Brest on November 1. Khrushchev and Malenkov immediately informed their
However, they could not convince Gomulka of the Yugoslav counterparts.17
necessity of implementing the Soviet plan.10 With even From the memoirs of Khrushchev and Micunovic as
greater disquiet, Khrushchev and Malenkov went on to the well as the subsequent secret correspondence between
meeting with Yugoslav leader Josip Tito,11 expecting, in Moscow and Belgrade, it is clear that there were certain
Khrushchev s words, that it would be still more compli- differences in the positions of Soviet and Yugoslav
cated.12 But despite this expectation, quite the opposite participants at the meeting. The Yugoslav side especially
occurred. stressed that the government had to condemn the regime of
The secret meeting in Tito s residence on Brioni island Rakosi-Gerö, and put forth a program for surmounting the
which took place on the night of November 2-3 and at  Stalinist inheritance and  reforming socialism, using
which Tito, together with his assistants Edvard Kardelj and the support of recently-emerged worker councils in
Aleksandr Rankovich and in the presence of ambassador Hungary.18 Although the Soviet notions of acceptable
Micunovic, conducted negotiations with Khrushchev and parameters for  reform were significantly narrower than
Malenkov, was until recently known about partly from the Yugoslav, judging by the documents, they did not
Khrushchev s memoirs, but for the most part from object to these proposals. As for the selection of people for
Micunovic s memoirs. According to the latter s testimony, the government in question, Khrushchev expressed his
there were no records made during the meeting, but support for the candidacy of Ferenc Munnich as prime
afterwards he set down the contents from memory.13 In minister, while the Yugoslav side leaned more toward
one of the documents of the former CC LCY archive, the Kadar. In addition, the Yugoslavs favored including in the
existence of this record was mentioned, but I was not able government certain persons close to Nagy. According to
to locate it.14 Clearly it was the basis for the account of Micunovic, Geza Losonczy and Pal Maleter were men-
the Brioni meeting in Micunovic s memoirs. But from tioned. Khrushchev also noted the Yugoslav selection of
other archival materials it becomes clear that the memoirs candidates in his memoirs, but, without remembering their
do not include much that was discussed. Both Khrushchev names, maintained that both were rejected as unaccept-
and Micunovic relate the following basic results of the able.19
meeting: when the high ranking Soviet visitors informed From the subsequent secret Soviet-Yugoslav corre-
the Yugoslav side of the Kremlin s decision to employ spondence it becomes clear that the Yugoslav agreement
military force in Hungary again in order to replace the with the proposed Soviet military intervention was
Nagy government and to  defend socialism, Tito, to the accompanied at the Brioni meeting with an agreement to
 pleasant surprise of Khrushchev and Malenkov, immedi- give political assistance to the Soviet troops and in the
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN 10 141
replacement of Nagy with a  revolutionary worker-peasant agreed upon with Khrushchev, they contacted Nagy. But
government. Until recently, such an agreement was neither Tito nor Kardelj explained what exactly had been
essentially unknown. It is not mentioned in Khrushchev s undertaken. In correspondence, Tito only tied the [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]